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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
stantive right in favor of a married woman only if the accident
occurs here. This was based on the rule that the law of the place
where the accident occurs determines the substantive rights aris-
ing therefrom. The court's disposition of the case is believed to
be a consistent application of the original holding that the act
created a cause of action in favor of the wife.
The State Department of Highways was held to be a "per-
son" and therefore entitled to a direct action against the insurers
of a steamship company umder the provision of Act 253 of 1918
as amended by Act 55 of 1930, in Department of Highways v.
Lykes Brothers S. S. Company, Incorporated.6 The general rule
was applied that the word "person" as used in a statute is to be
held to include corporations where such bodies fall within the
reason and purpose of the act.
VI. PROCEDURE
Henry G. McMahon*
Original Jurisdiction
Glover v. Mayer, presents interesting but futile efforts of
plaintiff to resist the force of defendant's exception to the juris-
diction ratione personae of the trial court. A suit to recover
plaintiff's share under an alleged profit-sharing agreement for
the operation of defendant's plantation was instituted in the
parish where the latter was situated, rather than that where
defendant was domiciled. Defendant's exception was resisted by
plaintiff through the arguments: (1) that the alleged contract
constituted a partnership between the two litigants, and hence
the suit was properly brought in the parish where the partner-
ship was established;2 and (2) that the action was one to recover
for "labor performed" on a plantation within the intendment of
the statute permitting such suits to be brought in the parish
where the plantation was situated. In affirming the decision
maintaining defendant's exception, the appellate court swept
both contentions aside through the application of the principle
that exceptions to the general rule of suit at defendant's domicile
were strictly construed. Since the petition alleged no facts show-
6. 209 La. 881, 24 So.(2d) 623 (1945).
* Professor of Civil Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 209 La. 599, 25 So. (2d) 242 (1946).
2. Art. 165 (2), La. Code of Practice of 1870, as last amended by La. Act
282 of 1940.
3. La. Act 16 of 1886 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 5143].
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ing any intention of the parties to form a partnership, as to the
parties inter sese it was held that the profit-sharing agreement
did not constitute a partnership. Under the required strict con-
struction, the services of plaintiff were held not to be "labor per-
formed" within the intendment of the statute relied upon.
Bercegeay v. Techeland Oil Corporation4 is a decision which
may torment its creators for some time to come. Relying upon
the code provision permitting real actions to be brought either
in the domicile of defendant or in the parish where the property
is situated,6 plaintiffs brought suit in St. Mary Parish to annul
an oil and gas lease affecting lands in that parish. Both corporate
defendants previously had been thrown into receivership in pro-
ceedings in Orleans Parish, on grounds of insolvency. One de-
fendant failed to make any appearance, the other merely denying
plaintiffs' allegations. Prior to judgment, the purchaser of the
leasehold interest under a sale in the receivership proceedings
intervened in the suit so as to join defendants in resisting plain-
tiffs' demands. Intervener and both defendants appealed from
the trial court's judgment annulling the lease. In the appellate
court, appellants challenged the trial court's jurisdiction by in-
voking Article 165 (3) of the Code of Practice, providing that in
all matters of failure all subsequent suits against the debtor must
be instituted in the court declaring the failure. The supreme
court recognized this provision as applicable to insolvent cor-
porations in receivership, took the position that the mandatory
language thereof excluded application of the code provision re-
lied on by plaintiffs, and for good measure held that the code
provision relied on by appellants was one relating to jurisdiction
ratione materiae, which had not been waived through failure to
raise the objection in the trial court. The decision is unfortunate
in three respects. First, in relying upon a code provision which was
an adjunct of the old state insolvency procedure and which should
have been recognized as suspended by the adoption of the Na-
tional Bankruptcy Act, the court unnecessarily has duplicated
receivership procedure by recognizing one rule as being applic-
able to insolvent corporations in receivership, with another ap-
plicable to corporations thrown i n t o receivership on other
grounds. Second, in taking the position that the mandatory lan-
4. 209 La. 33, 24 So. (2d) 242 (1945).
5. "In actions for revendication of real property . . . the defendant may
be cited ...either within the jurisdiction where the property revendicated
... is situated ... or in that where the defendant has his domicil, as
plaintiff chooses . . . ." Art. 163, La. Code of Practice of 1870, as amended
by La. Act 64 of 1876.
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guage of the code provision prevented the application of other
provisions in pari materia, the court has announced a narrow
rule which probably will prove unworkable in the future. Many
of the code provisions on the subject of jurisdiction ratione per-
sonae similarly are couched in mandatory language. When any
given case falls within two or more of such provisions, an irre-
sistible force meets an immovable object. Last, the confusion
worked between rules relating to venue and those applicable to
jurisdiction ratione materiae will prove embarrassing to the court
in the future. For a detailed consideration of these points, the
interested reader is referred to the note on this case appearing
in a subsequent issue.'"
Exceptions
Only a few of the cases involving the procedural exceptions
are of sufficient interest to warrant extended discussion here.
The trite rule that for the purposes of the trial of the exception
of no cause of action the well-pleaded allegations of the petition
must be accepted as being true, received its annual application.,
The cases involving res judicata, for convenience of treatment,
are discussed hereinafter. 8
The exception of misjoinder of parties was invoked unsuc-
cessfully in Watson v. Bethany. There, the plaintiff obtained an
option to purchase property belonging to the community existing
between husband and wife, which option was timely recorded.
Subsequently, the wife, in an effort to defeat any exercise of this
option, recorded a document declaring that the property in ques-
tion was a family homestead. The husband being unwilling to
permit plaintiff to exercise his option of purchase, the optionee
placed the owner of the property in default and subsequently
brought suit for specific performance, joining both husband and
wife as parties defendant. The propriety of this joinder was one
of the issues presented to the appellate court for determination.
Since both husband and wife had a common interest in the out-
come of the suit, inasmuch as the obligatory nature of the option
involved the legal efficacy of the homestead declaration, the
joinder of the parties defendant was held proper.
6. To be noted in the March issue of this Review.
7. Gorham v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 27 So. (2d) 299 (La. 1946).
8. Infra, pp. 270-274.
9. 209 La. 989, 26 So. (2d) 12 (1946).
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The only case in the field of procedural exceptions decided
during the past term which offers possibilities of developing into
a landmark decision is West v. Ray.11 Plaintiff brought suit to
enforce contribution by the defendants toward the payment of
a note executed jointly by the two and which had been paid by
plaintiff to avoid suit. Under proper allegations, certain property
of defendant was attached. The petition contained allegations
sufficient to state a prima facie case, but unfortunately, by way
of surplusage, alleged that the funds borrowed by the two liti-
gants on the note in question were used by them in a joint ven-
ture. Seizing upon the general rule that one partner may not sue
another until the termination of the partnership, defendant ex-
cepted to the petition on the ground that it disclosed no cause
of action. Inasmuch as this general rule of partnership recog-
nized a number of exceptions, none of which appeared to have
been negatived by the allegations of the petition, plaintiff urged
that the exception should be overruled. From a judgment of the
trial court sustaining the exception and dissolving the attach-
ment, plaintiff appealed. The case is typical of those instances
where, through some ambiguity or surplusage in the petition,
defendant seeks to assert an affirmative defense through the ex-
ception of no cause for action.
In such cases, the court is faced with the necessity of recon-
ciling two rules of pleading, each supreme in its own sphere,
which clash when an affirmative defense is sought to be invoked
on the face of the petition. Appellee's position necessarily was
predicated upon the general rule that all ambiguities must be
resolved against the pleader. Appellant's position, on the other
hand, rested upon the requirement that the defendant plead and
prove all of the essentials of an affirmative defense. Heretofore,
the question has been presented chiefly in tort cases where the
defendant's exception of no cause of action raised the issue that
plaintiff's contributory negligence was established by his own
allegations, and in these cases the Louisiana courts generally
have resolved the doubts in favor of the plaintiff. The same ra-
tionale was followed in the West case, with Justice Kennon
announcing the rule that whenever an affirmative defense was
raised through the exception of no cause of action, the allega-
tions of the plaintiff's petition must exclude every reasonable
hypothesis other than the affirmative defense invoked. Since less
liberal rules of procedure have been applied in the past in cases
11. 210 La. 25, 26 So. (2d) 221 (1946).
19471
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involving conservatory writs, the decision carries the court far
forward in its announced program of not permitting procedural
technicalities to deny plaintiff the opportunity of trying his case
on the merits. For a more complete discussion of applicable prin-
ciples involved, the reader is referred to the annotation on this
case appearing in a later issue."1
The distinction, both in function and in operation, of the ex-
ceptions of no right of action and no cause of action was clarified
further in Termini v. McCormick."0 Occasionally, the line between
the functions of these two pleadings becomes exceedingly difficult
to draw.14 In the majority of instances, however, there is no ne-
cessity for either counsel or the court to distinguish between
these most important exceptions in Louisiana procedure, hence
the common practice of pleading the two together as a double-
barrelled remedy. One rather important difference in the modus
operendi of these two exceptions is that while no cause of action
necessarily admits all of the well-pleaded allegations of the pe-
tition, the exception of no right of action may controvert the
petition's allegations and evidence may be adduced on the trial
of this exception. 15 In the Termini case, plaintiff filed suit to set
aside a judgment decreeing the termination of proceedings liqui-
dating a corporation, dissolving the latter and discharging the
liquidator. Defendant excepted to this petition inter alia on the
grounds that it disclosed no right and no cause of action. On the
trial of the exceptions, the trial court admitted evidence in sup-
port of the former exception. Apparently, because of the fact
that the allegations of the petition relating to plaintiff's right to
institute and prosecute the action had not been controverted in
the exception of no right of action, the appellate court reversed
a judgment sustaining the exception in question. Upon the ex-
amination of the allegations of the petition, however, the supreme
court agreed with the trial judge that the latter disclosed no
cause of action and on this ground affirmed the judgment of the
court below rejecting plaintiff's demands. In the course of the
12. To be noted in the March issue of this Review.
13. 208 La. 221, 23 So. (2d) 52 (1945).
14. Cf. Duplain v. Wiltz, 174 So. 652 (La. App. 1937).
15. Jones v. Shehee-Ford Wagon and Harness Co., 183 La. 293, 163 So.
129 (1935); Duplain v. Wiltz, 174 So. 652 (La. App. 1937); Alsaya v. Johnson,
178 So. 518 (La. App. 1938); McCain v. LeBlanc Bros., 10 So. (2d) 116 (La.
App. 1942); Hand v. Coker, 11 So. (2d) 272 (La. App. 1942); Bartholomew
v. Impastato, 12 So. (2d) 700 (La. App. 1943); Fields v. McAdams, 15 So. (2d)
246 (La. App. 1943); and Lunkin v. Triangle Farms, Inc., 24 So. (2d) 213 (La.
App. 1945). See also Beard v. Vincent, 174 La. 869, 141 So. 862 (1932); Miller
v. United States Guaranty and Fidelity Co., 169 So. 259 (La. App. 1936).
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opinion the appellate court found it again necessary to distinguish
between the two pleadings in question. The exception of no right
of action, based upon Article 15 of the Code of Practice, was held
available to question the right of a plaintiff to maintain his suit
and to dispute the interest of that litigant on the subject matter
of the proceedings. The function of the exception of no cause of
action was stated to present the issue of whether sufficient
grounds for obtaining the desired relief are alleged in the petition.
Amenndment of Answer
In the past the jurisprudential rules announced by the Lou-
isiana courts with respect to the amendment of the answer have
been in conflict. Strangely enough, both these rules are stated
by the court as flowing from the same code provisions. 6 On the
one hand, the courts have taken the position that the assertion
of an additional defense by an amended answer results in a
change of issue calling for the rejection of the amended answer
tendered.'7 On the other hand, the more liberal practice has
been sanctioned of permitting even an additional defense to be
urged by the amended answer as long as the prayer of the latter
is consistent with that of the original answer.18 Two cases on the
subject were decided by the supreme court during the last term.
The ruling of the trial judge, permitting the filing of a supple-
mental and amended petition, in Succession of Cambre,19 might
have been justified under either of these two rules. There, the
amended petition merely sought to amplify and to elaborate the
allegations of the original answer, hence could hardly be said to
have changed the issue.
The more liberal of the two rules relative to amendment of
answer was applied in Labarre v. Rateau." The defendants in
this case originally had filed an action against the present plain-
tiffs to annul a transfer of property to the latter made by the com-
mon ancestor of the litigants, and at the same time had recorded
a notice of lis pendens in the public records. This suit eventually
16. Art. 420, Ia. Code of Practice of 1870.
17. State v. Bozeman, 156 La. 635, 101 So. 4 (1924) and cases cited; Avegno
v. Fosdick, 28 La. Ann. 109 (1876); Babcock v. Shirley, 11 La. 73 (1837);
Martin v. Toye Bros. Yellow Cab Co., 162 So. 257 (La. App. 1935) affirmed
on rehearing, 164 So. 175. Cf. Vicknair v. Terracina, 164 La. 117, 113 So. 787
(1927).
18. Southport Mill v. Friedricks, 167 La. 101, 118 So. 818 (1928); Meyer
v. Farmer, 36 La. Ann. 785 (1884); Adle v. Metoyer, 1 La. Ann. 254 (1846);
Matlock v. State, 4 So. (2d) 90 (La. App. 1941); Hortman-Salmen Co. v.
High-Grade Realty Co., 12 La. App. 559, 126 So. 566 (1930) and cases cited.
19. 27 So. (2d) 296 (La. 1946).
20. 210 La. 34, 26 So. (2d) 279 (1946).
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was declared abandoned for want of prosecution during a period
of five years, and the present suit was instituted by the original
defendants to cancel and erase the lis pendens inscribed when
the original suit was filed. In their answer the present defen-
dants converted the suit into a petitory action by asserting own-
ership to the property in question, again attacking the transfer
in question on the ground that the recited consideration in the
instrument had never been paid to the ancestor and hence the
transfer was a donation in disguise. The present plaintiffs pleaded
prescription in bar of the defendant's petitory action. On the day
of the trial, the defendants filed an amended answer in which
they set forth additional grounds of nullity of the transfer thus
attacked. The action of the trial judge in permitting the filing of
the amended answer over the objection of plaintiffs' counsel that
it came too late and changed the issues of the case presented one
of the more serious points submitted to the appellate court. Since
both answers contained substantially the same prayer, the appel-
late court upheld the ruling of the trial judge on this point. De-
spite the fact that the court cited no case precedent for the posi-
tion taken, the result of this phase of the decision is in accord
with the more liberal rule on the subject.
Production of Evidence
The present statute authorizing the taking of testimony by
deposition under oral examination 2' of witnesses outside of the
state or outside of the parish where the case is pending was con-
strued in Arnold v. Sun Oil Company.2 2 In an effort to procure
the testimony of certain nonresident witnesses, plaintiff ruled
defendants into court to show cause why a commission authoriz-
ing the taking of such testimony should not issue. Among the
witnesses in question was an attorney for the named defendant
who was sought to be cross-examined. 23 Plaintiffs resisted the
rule for the issuance of this commission primarily on the ground
that defendants would be subjected to considerable expense in
having counsel present at the various points outside the state
where the testimony was to be taken. Further reasons adduced
were that the suit was a petitory action and oral testimony would
be inadmissible, that the cross-examination of the attorney for
the named defendant should be limited to matters not privileged
21. La. Act 143 of 1934 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 1998.1-1998.5].
22. 209 La. 866, 25 So. (2d) 619 (1946).
23. Under the provisions of La. Act 115 of 1934, as amended by La. Act
310 of 1940 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1946) §§ 1995-1995.2].
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and that the cross-examination of another defendant was unnec-
essary as counsel gave assurance that he would be present at the
trial of the case on its merits and then available for cross-exami-
nation. The supervisory jurisdiction of the supreme court was
invoked by defendants in an effort to vacate or control the trial
judge's ruling directing the issuance of the commission. Pointing
out that under the applicable statutory provisions, neither liti-
gant had any absolute right to take testimony by deposition, that
such privilege could be claimed only after a contradictory hearing
on the rule for the issuance of the commission and that the mat-
ter was one which rested within the exercise of the trial judge's
sound judicial discretion, the appellate court held that under the
circumstances the trial judge had not abused his judicial discre-
tion. The court held that defendants could raise all pertinent
objections to the admissibility of the testimony at the time of
the trial of the case when the depositions would be read in evi-
dence.
The Trial
The action of the trial judge in consolidating cases for trial
was approved by the supreme court in two opinions. In Olivedell
Planting Company v. Town of Lake Providence,2 4 three separate
suits had been filed against the defendant municipal corporation
to recover damages sustained by the plaintiffs as a result of the
fire losses for which the defendant was alleged to be responsible.
Since the same issues and substantially the same facts were pre-
sented in each of the cases, they were held properly consolidated
for trial. The propriety of this ruling is substantiated by the fact
that under the circumstances the plaintiffs might have jointly
instituted a single suit against the defendant.2 1
In State ex rel. Theriot v. Pulling,6 the supervisory jurisdic-
tion of the supreme court was invoked in order to prevent a
consolidation between two suits involving substantially the
same issues and facts. The first action was one in which the pa-
ternal grandparents sought to obtain custody of a minor on the
grounds of the father's absence in military service and the moth-
er's obvious unfitness to rear her son. The second suit was one
brought by the father of the child against his wife to obtain an
absolute divorce on alleged facts which were identical with those
relied upon in the first case to establish the mother's unfitness.
24. 209 La. 898, 25 So. (2d) 735 (1946).
25. Cf. Gill v. City of Lake Charles, 119 La. 17, 43 So. 897 (1907).
26. 209 La. 871, 25 So. (2d) 620 (1946).
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The action of the trial judge in consolidating the two suits was
very properly upheld by the supreme court.
Actions of Nullity
One of the most interesting of the procedural cases decided
by the court during the past term was Evans v. Hamner," review-
ing under certiorari the judgment of a court of appeal. The action
was instituted in the trial court to annul a default judgment
previously rendered against the plaintiff in nullity. Two grounds
were relied upon for the avoidance of the judgment: (1) that
the confirmation of default was effected prior to the expiration
of two legal days after entry of the preliminary default;2 8 and
(2) that the failure of plaintiff to take any step in the prosecu-
tion of the action for a period of five years resulted in the aban-
donment of the suit and consequently no valid judgment could
be rendered thereafter. If an intervening Saturday would be con-
sidered a legal holiday under the pertinent statute,2 the default
would have been confirmed prematurely. The organ of the court
gave due consideration to this point and concluded that the "con-
firmation of the judgment by default therefore was premature.2 30
Curiously enough, however, the court then proceeded to make a
dictum out of its previous discussion and holding3 by stating
27. 209 La. 442, 24 So. (2d) 814 (1946).
28. Under Art. 312. La. Code of Practice of 1870, as last amended by La.
Act 90 of 1904, requiring that two days (whether judicial or non-judicial ex-
clusive of Sundays and legal holidays) elapse between the default and its
confirmation.
29. La. Act 165 of 1932, as last amended by La. Act 307 of 1938 [Dart's
Stats. (1939) § 3795] making Saturday a half-holiday throughout the state.
30. 209 La. 442, 447, 24 So.(2d) 814, 815 (1946).
31. Although the principal case cannot be regarded as settling this point,
the position taken by the court thereon is supported strongly by the lan-
guage of the code and statutory provisions cited in the two preceding foot-
notes and the doctrine of Frank v. Currie, 172 So. 843 (La. App. 1937). The
original statutes recognizing Saturdays as half-holidays in the larger towns
and cities of the state raised many interesting questions as to whether
these half-holidays are dies non juridicus. See La. Rev. Stats. of 1870, §
1114, as amended by La. Act 8 of 1904; La. Act 6 of 1904. The holding of
Rady v. Fire Ins. Patrol of New Orleans, 126 La. 273, 52 So. 491, 139 Am St.
Rep. 511 (1910), affirming this proposition, has been overturned at least in
part by the language of the present statute, making it "lawful to file and
record suits, deeds, mortgages and liens and to issue and serve citation and
to take and execute all other legal proceedings, and to make sheriff's sales
on Saturday half-holidays." La. Act 105 of 1932, as last amended by La. Act
307 of 1938 Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 3795-3795.2]. Since the original statutes
recognized Saturdays as half-holidays only in the larger municipalities,
questions were raised as to whether' these half-holidays would be regarded
as dies non by courts serving districts which included areas where Satur-
days were legal days. These questions were answered In the negative. 0. K.
Realty Co. v. John A. Juliani, Inc., 157 La. 277, 102 So. 399 (1924); State v.
Westmoreland, 117 La. 958, 42 So. 440 (1906). The present legislation recog-
nizes Saturdays as half-holidays throughout the state, but its language ex-
1947] THE WORK OF THE SUPREME COURT
that it would rest its decision upon the second point presented.
With respect to the latter, the appellate court held that the fail-
ure of a plaintiff to take any step in the prosecution of his suit
for a period of five years ipso facto works an abandonment of
the cause without the necessity of any action being taken by
defendant to have this abandonment judicially decreed,8 2 and
that no further proceedings may be taken by plaintiff thereafter
in the cause. The holding of the supreme court on this point ac-
cords with the latest decision of the intermediate courts of ap-
peal.38
Two other decisions concerning the action of nullity appear
to be run-of-the-mill decisions. In one,"4 the appellate court over-
ruled the exception of no cause of action under which the nullity
action had been dismissed in the lower court. In this case, plain-
tiff's petition alleged that the judgment complained of was a
nullity for the reason that it was based upon a confession of
judgment prohibited by the pertinent constitutional provision,8
and that the confession of judgment was obtained by plaintiff
through the fraudulent representation that it was an instrument
necessary to effect a transfer of property in full settlement of
plaintiff's claim. In the other,6 a judgment obtained was avoided
on the ground that the claim sued upon had previously been in-
cluded in a scale down agreement under the Emergency Farm
Mortgage Act,8 7 as a result of which the debtor had refinanced
pressly making it lawful "to take and execute all other legal proceedings"
leaves it doubtful as to whether Saturdays must be considered a holiday in
calculating the various procedural delays. In a well reasoned and carefully
considered opinion in Frank v. Currie, supra, Justice McCaleb (as the organ
of the Orleans Court of Appeal) held that while many legal acts might be
performed validly on Saturdays, persons charged with the duty of perform-
ing legal acts were not required by the statute to perform them on Satur-
days any more than on a full holiday.
32. Under the provisions of Art. 3519, La. Civil Code of 1870, as amended
by La. Act 107 of 1898, providing that "Whenever the plaintiff having made
his demand shall at any time before obtaining final judgment allow five
years to elapse without having taken any steps in the prosecution thereof,
he shall be considered as having abandoned the same."
33. Sandfleld Oil and Gas Co. v. Paul, 7 So. (2d) 725 (La. App. 1942). The
organ of the court quoted approvingly from a number of the court's former
decisions in support of this position. However, in all of the latter the de-
fendant had moved for and obtained a judgment from the trial court recog-
nizing the abandonment of the suit. The result reached in the principal
case and in Sandfield Oil and Gas Co. v. Paul, supra, is diametrically op-
posed to the position taken by the court in Hibernia Bank and Trust Co. v.J. M. Dresser Co., 14 La. App. 555, 131 So. 752 (1930), cited with approval in
King v. Illinois Central R. Co., 143 So. 95, 97 (La. App. 1932).
34. Cilluffa v. Monreale Realty Co., 209 La. 333, 24 So. (2d) 606 (1945).
35. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 44.
36. Federal Farm Mortg. Corp. v. Hatten, 210 La. 249, 26 So. (2d) 735
(1946).
37. Act of June 25, 1940, c. 427, 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1016 and 1020b.
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all of his obligations under a mortgage granted to the Federal
Farm Mortgage Corporation. Under the express provisions of
the congressional legislation involved, the Federal Farm Mort-
gage Corporation was held to have a sufficient interest to bring
the nullity proceedings, and the judgment for the original amount
of the debt was held invalid. The action of nullity was timely
brought inasmuch as it was instituted within less than a year
from the date that plaintiff learned of the rendition of the judg-
ment.
Adkins' Heirs v. Crawford, Jenkins and Booth,3 8 was the
last of a series of three actions reaching the supreme court. In
the first of these cases,3 9 the present defendant was successful in
a petitory action brought to be decreed the owner of a tract of
land, and the judgment of the supreme court was predicated
upon a recognition of the validity of a tax title to this property.
In the second of these cases, the former defendants in the pe-
titory action instituted nullity proceedings to avoid the original
judgment. This action of nullity was dismissed in the trial court
on exception, but on appeal this action was reversed and tle case
remanded for trial.40 Subsequently, certain of these plaintiffs in
nullity, who had alleged that they had not properly been made
parties to the original action, compromised their claims against
the defendant; and the suit was continued only as to a single
plaintiff. The two grounds of nullity remaining both challenged
the validity of the tax deed which previously had been recognized
as valid. First, the tax title was attacked on the ground that it
was a simulation and part of a fraudulent scheme by the ostens-
ible owner of the property and his son to deprive the rightful
owners of their property through the machination of a tax sale.
Inasmuch as the present defendants in the action of nullity ad-
mittedly were not parties to any such conspiracy, the point was
held to be without merit. The plaintiff's second ground of attack
on the validity of the tax deed was based on an allegation that
the taxes for which the property had been sold had been paid by
a third party on a portion of the property. This ground of nul-
lity likewise was held not to be any actionable basis for the
avoidance of the judgment. Probably the most important prin-
ciple of law mentioned by the organ of the court was one not
directly presented as an issue. In the supreme court decision it
38. 209 La. 46, 24 So. (2d) 246 (1945).
39. Crawford, Jenkins and Booth v. Wills, 189 La. 366, 179 So. 455 (1938).
40. Adkins' Heirs v. Crawford, Jenkins and Booth, 200 La. 561, 8 So. (2d)
539 (1942).
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was stated to be the settled jurisprudence that "'In a petitory
action, the defendant is bound to plead all the titles under which
he claims to be owner, and a final judgment rendered in favor
of the plaintiff may be pleaded as res judicata against any title
which the defendant was possessed of at the time, but omitted
to plead.' "I' Under the facts of the case, it is difficult to discern
the applicability of the rule as quoted above, as it appears that
the plaintiff was not attempting to assert a second title in the
principal case but rather was urging a second defense to the tax
title theretofore successfully asserted by the present defendant.
The decision of the appellate court is unassailable under either
view, but it is to be regretted that this most important rule of
res judicata -4 2 lacks any application to the facts of the case.
One very interesting aspect of the Adkins' Heirs case is a
point which was not put at issue by the defendants. Heretofore,
the only square decisions on the subject have held that if a judg-
ment of a trial court is affirmed on appeal, the latter thus be-
comes a decree of the appellate court, and the trial court lacks
jurisdiction to annul this judgment.4 3 Since under the present
constitution the appellate courts have no original jurisdiction to
entertain actions in nullity, a most unfortunate hiatus exists
under our procedure. The judgment sought to be annulled in the
Adkins' Heirs case was one which had been affirmed on appeal
41. 209 La. 46, 50, 24 So(2d) 246, 248 (1945).
42. One of the most interesting clashes between common law and civilian
principles of res judicata occurs with respect to matters which might have
been but were not pleaded in the first suit. Art. 2286, La. Civil Code of 1870,
which was taken from Art. 1351 of the Code Napoleon, enunciates the gen-
eral doctrines of the civil law on the subject of res judicata, stating that
"The authority of the thing adjudged takes place only with respect to what
was the object of the judgment. The thing demanded must be the same;
the demand must be founded on the same cause of action; the demand
must be between the same parties, and formed by them against each other
in the same quality." In the aggregate, the rules relating to res judicata and
those governing estoppel by judgment in common law jurisdictions are very
much broader. See Comment (1940) 2 LOUISIANA LAW REvizw 347, 491. By
reason of interstitial seepage from common law jurisdictions, the Louisiana
rules on the subject were being constantly broadened until the decision in
Hope v. Madison, 194 La. 337, 193 So. 666 (1940). In the latter, the supreme
court carefully considered the doctrine of Article 2286 and the previous
Louisiana cases on the subject and in fact refused to yield further to com-
mon law influences. It did, however, recognize three exceptions to the gen-
eral rule that a judgment is conclusive only of the matters raised and de-
cided upon in the suit: In petitory actions, actions for partition and suits
for. injunctions against executory process, the judgment rendered is con-
clu'sive not only of the matters which might have been pleaded but also of
those which were available to plaintiff and might have been pleaded. The
principal case recognizes the first and most important of these three ex-
ceptions.
43. Succession of Martin v. Succession of Hoggatt, 37 La. Ann. 340
(1885); Melancon's Heirs v. Broussard, 2 La. 8 (1830).
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to the supreme court," hence in the nullity action the jurisdic-
tion of the trial court might have been challenged on this ground.
Although the matter was not presented to or considered by the
court, it is to be hoped that the principal case may serve as an
entering wedge towards the overturning of the prior jurisprudence
supporting the proposition that a trial court is without jurisdic-
tion to annul a judgment affirmed on appeal.
Appellate Jurisdiction
Four cases considering this subject were decided by the
court during the last term. One of the most interesting" in-
volves the manner of calculating the appellate jurisdictional
amount in an action of boundary. The plaintiff railroad brought
suit against an individual engaged in the junk business to fix the
boundary between two contiguous pieces of property. Under the
prior jurisprudence,'46 for purposes of determining jurisdiction
on appeal the amount involved in boundary cases had been held
to be the value of the property lying between the contested
boundary lines. More than this was involved, however, in the
case under consideration since if the appeal were unsuccessful,
the defendant would have been obliged to remove all encroach-
ments, both structural and movable, on the contested strip. Ac-
cordingly, the cost of effecting such removal was added to the
value of the contested strip of land for purposes of determining
the jurisdictional amount. Despite this liberal formula, however,
the amount in controversy was below the jurisdictional limit of
the supreme court and the case was transferred to the proper
court of appeal.
In Childs v. Jones,47 the plaintiff brought an ejectment pro-
ceeding in a district court to obtain possession of leased prem-
ises. The defendant was in possession under a verbal month-to-
month lease with a monthly rental of $32.50. The case, therefore,
was one involving less than $100 of which the district court had
concurrent jurisdiction with the city court of the municipality
in which the property was located. Under the pertinent consti-
44. See Crawford, Jenkins and Booth v. Wills, 189 La. 366, 179 So. 455
(1938).
45. New Orleans and Northeastern R. Co. v. Redmann, 27 So. (2d) 321
(La. 1946).
46. Beatty v. Sharp, 135 La. 250, 65 So. 232 (1914); Gasquet v. Conway,
116 La. 709, 41 So. 44 (1906); Beasley v. Glassell, 110 La. 230, 34 So. 424 (1903);
Salles v. Jacquet, 108 La. 107, 32 So. 411 (1902); Hite v. Hinsel and Tallieu,
39 Ia. Ann. 113, 1 So. 415 (1887); Lombard v. Belanger, 35 La. Ann. 311
(1883).
47. 209 La. 609, 25 So. (2d) 281 (1946).
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tutional provisions," it was held that the case was unappealable.
The supervisory jurisdiction of the supreme court might have
been invoked by defendant in order to inquire into the regularity
and validity of an unappealable judgment, but defendant made
no effort to invoke this form of relief.
In Trorlicht v. Collector of Revenue, 9 the State Board of
Tax Appeals had granted a taxpayer relief from an attempt by
the Collector of Revenue to assess a deficiency in the payment
of income taxes during the years 1938 and 1939. Thereafter, the
Collector of Revenue petitioned the proper district court for a
review and annulment of the decision of the Board of Tax Ap-
peals. The requested review was granted by the court, which,
finding no error had been committed by the Board of Tax Ap-
peals, affirmed the latter's decision. The defendant sued out an
appeal to the supreme court where the court ex proprio motu
noticed its lack of jurisdiction and transferred the appeal to the
proper intermediate appellate court. The point of substantive
law presented involved an interpretation of provisions of the
Civil Code relating to community property, and there was no
question of the constitutionality or legality of the tax statute.
Since only $915.00 was involved, and no special pertinent consti-
tutional provision granted jurisdiction to the supreme court, the
latter very properly transferred the appeal.
Town of DeQuincy v. Wood 50 presented a fairly well-settled
question of appellate jurisdiction and a most interesting point
of substantive law discussed elsewhere in this symposium.51 The
appeal presented the issue as to the enforceability of a municipal
ordinance authorizing the paving of a street and the assessment
of the cost thereof upon the owners of lots abutting the street
thus sought to be improved. Under these circumstances, the ap-
peal was held properly prosecuted to the supreme court, under
the constitutional provision granting that court jurisdiction over
all appeals in cases "wherein the . . . legality of any . . . local
improvement assessment . . . levied by any ... municipality
• . .of the State is contested. '52
Appeals and Appellate Procedure
Motions to dismiss the appeals for various reasons were filed
48. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, §§ 29-35, 48.
49. 209 La. 167, 24 So. (2d) 366 (1945).
50. 27 So. (2d) 314 (L& 1946).
51. Supra, p. 197.
52. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 10.
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in a number of cases. In one,53 the motion was based upon a sug-
gestion that the transcript of appeal did not contain all of the
proceedings of the court below. Under the provisions of the
remedial statute,"' and in view of the fact that the deficiency of
the record had been cured by the filing of a supplemental trans-
cript prior to any action on the motion, the latter was overruled.
In another,55 the appeal was attempted to be dismissed for the
reason that appellant had failed to sign the suspensive appeal
bond as principal. Prior to action on this motion, a substitute
appeal bond was filed in the appellate court under the provisions
of the 1916 act. 56 Although the overruling of the motion could
have been pitched upon the provisions of this statute alone, the
court took occasion to point out that since appellant was pri-
marily bound for the amount of the judgment appealed from,
his failure to sign the appeal bond did not invalidate the latter.
In Barretta v. Cocreham 7 an appeal was taken from a judg-
ment refusing to enjoin the collector of revenue and the board
of tax appeals from interfering with the operations of plaintiff's
retail liquor and beer business on the ground that the statutes
under which the defendants had acted in revoking plaintiff's
licenses for 1945 were unconstitutional. While the case was pend-
ing on appeal, plaintiff was convicted of violating the state sta-
tute relative to the sale of intoxicating liquors. Based upon the
latter contention, as well as upon the theory that the year for
which the licenses in question had been issued had now passed,
appellees unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the appeal. The first
point was held to have no connection with any of the issues
presented by the appeal. With respect to the second contention,
the court pointed out that since a permit to sell liquor could not
be issued to anyone whose permit had been revoked during the
preceding five years, the question presented by the appeal did not
become moot with the expiration of the year for which the li-
cense was issued.
Two cases presented issues of the trial court's jurisdiction
after the appellate court had remanded the cases for further
proceedings in accordance with the judgment rendered on ap-
peal. In Alba v. Holstead,58 this issue was tendered as the basis
53. Richmond v. Newson, 209 L. 922, 25 So. (2d) 899 (1946).
54. La. Act 234 of 1932 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1978.1).
55. Blaize v. Cazezu, 208 La. 1081, 24 So. (2d) 147 (1945).
56. La. Act 112 of 1916, as amended by La. Act 284 of 1928 [Dart's Stats.
(1939) §§ 1921-30].
57. 210 La. 55, 26 So. (2d) 286 (1946).
58. 210 La. 75, 26 So. (2d) 292 (1946).
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for the motion to dismiss, and the appellate court properly held
that whether the trial court had exceeded its jurisdiction or not
could only be determined after a hearing on the merits of the ap-
peal, and hence such a contention could not be accepted as a valid
basis for dismissing the appeal. On the merits of the appeal taken
in this case," and another,6" it was held that when an appellate
court renders a final judgment disposing of all the issues pre-
sented, and the case is remanded to the trial court merely for the
purposes of obtaining sufficient facts to apply the holding of the
case, any matter determined by the appellate court is no longer
subject to reconsideration by the court of original jurisdiction.
The point decided on appeal is the law of the case.
The purposes of an appeal are to review matters passed upon
by the trial court, and ordinarily an appellate court will not
consider contentions presented there for the first time. In Crichton
v. Lee,"' this rule was utilized to eliminate from consideration
questions presented for the first time in the supreme court.
In Brown v. Vernon Parish School Board,2 the appellate
court refused to consider a reconventional demand filed by the
defendant where the latter neither appealed nor answered the
appeal prosecuted by the plaintiff. This position by the appellate
court is unquestionably correct. It is unfortunate, however, that
the defendant had not answered plaintiff's appeal timely-thus
affording the court an opportunity to overrule one or the other
of the conflicting lines of jurisprudence on the subject of whether
such answer is sufficient to permit the review of the trial court's
judgment dismissing the reconventional demand.6 3
Supervisory Jurisdiction and Procedure
A settled rule of law was applied and a novel procedure
utilized in Rapides Central Railway Company v. Missouri Pacific
Railroad Company. The present Constitution recognizes two
different forms of supervisory jurisdiction in the appellate
courts: one only in aid of appellate jurisdiction which is inherent
in all appellate courts,', and the other the plenary jurisdiction
59. Alba v. Holstead, 27 So. (2d) 130 (La. 1946).
60. Jordan v. Smith, 209 La. 1028, 26 So. (2d) 128 (1946).
61. 209 IA. 561, 25 So. (2d) 229 (1946).
62. 209 La. 725, 25 So. (2d) 446 (1946).
63. The cases pro and con are listed in McMahon, Louisiana Practice
(1939) 1023-24, Note 18.
64. 209 La. 26, 24 So. (2d) 240 (1945).
65. On this point see Putnam and Norman v. Levee, 179 La. 180, 153 So.
685 (1934); Bailey v. Schiro, 169 So. 898 (La. App. 1936) and cases cited
therein.
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of the supreme court to regulate and control all proceedings in
the inferior courts of the state." The distinction between these
two types of supervisory jurisdiction becomes important when-
ever necessary to obtain relief through an invocation of super-
visory jurisdiction. In the Rapides Central Railway Company
case, the plaintiff sought to expropriate a crossing and right-of-
way over the tracks of the defendant railway. Defendant at-
tempted to appeal suspensively from a judgment in favor of
plaintiff as prayed for, but the trial court would grant only a
devolutive appeal. Taking the latter to the supreme court, by
separate application defendant attempted to invoke the super-
visory jurisdiction of that court to coerce the trial judge into
granting a suspensive appeal and in the alternative to have the
devolutive appeal taken recognized as suspending the execution
of the judgment complained of. Pointing out that it had no juris-
diction over the appeal so prosecuted, the supreme court held
that it was powerless to grant the supervisory relief prayed for,
which was only in aid of an appellate jurisdiction. No statutory
provision for a transfer is made where a litigant invokes the
supervisory jurisdiction of the wrong court. However, where the
case is appealed to the wrong court, statutory authority exists
for the transfer of the appeal to the proper court. Under the ex-
press language of the statute, the devolutive appeal was trans-
ferred to the proper intermediate court, and on the theory that
the application for supervisory writs was an incident thereto,
the latter similarly were transferred. The procedure employed
by relators and thus approved by the supreme court will prove
of value to counsel in similar cases in the future.
The present Constitution grants the supreme court authority
to review the decisions of the intermediate appellate court."
While this grant of jurisdiction is plenary and not limited to is-
sues of law, the statutory provision" prescribing the procedure
for the writ of review contemplates that the writ will be granted
only to review questions of law. However, this legislation further
provides that once the writ has been issued by the supreme
court, the case may be reviewed and determined "with the same
powers and authority in the case as if it had been carried directly
66. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 10 (1).
67. La. Act 56 of 1904, as amended by La. Act 19 of 1912 [Dart's Stats.
(1939) § 1427.
68. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 2.
69. La. Act 191 of 1898, § 2 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1449].
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by appeal to said court."70 In Hogan v. T. J. Moss Tie Company7
a writ was issued to review the decision of the court of appeal
so as to inquire into certain questions of law which apparently
were presented. Defendant moved to recall the writ previously
issued on the ground that only factual questions were presented
by the record and that the intermediate appellate court's findings
of fact could not thus be reviewed by the supreme court. The
organ of the latter, overruling the motion to recall the writ,
pointed out that while the court consistently refrained from
issuing the writ of review where only factual issues were in-
volved, once the writ had issued the court felt compelled to ad-
judicate on questions of fact as well as any legal issues presented.
Since the writ of review had been issued so as to consider cer-
tain legal inferences drawn by the appellate court, the supreme
court had the power to review the entire record or any issue ap-
pearing therein.
In many instances when the supreme court refuses to grant
a writ of error to review the decision of one of the intermediate
appellate courts, this action is based upon the statement that the
judgment sought to be reviewed is correct. Two possible inter-
pretations may be assigned to this procedure. First, it may be
contended that the entire opinion of the intermediate court is
thus adopted. Second, it may mean that only the result reached
by the appellate court is thus approved. This point was presented
in Glassell, Taylor and Robinson v. John W. Harris Associates,72
where the court held that the refusal to grant a writ of review
on the ground that the judgment of the court of appeal was
correct did not constitute any approval or adoption of the reasons
assigned by the court but only that the court's decree was deemed
correct under the facts of the case.
Conservatory Writs
Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University v. Hart73
effected a satisfactory settlement of the question of an at-
tachment creates a privilege in favor of the attaching credi-
tor. To recover the $75,000 alleged overpayment by plaintiff in
the Bienville Hotel "double dip" sale, plaintiff sued the named
defendant and others, obtaining an attachment of the property
of the defendant, Dr. James Monroe Smith. Subsequent to the
70. Ibid.
71. 27 So. (2d) 131 (La. 1946).
72. 209 La. 957, 26 So. (2d) 1 (1946).
78. 210 . 78, 26 So. (2d) 861 (1946).
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attachment but prior to judgment thereon, the United States
assessed additional income taxes, penalities and interests for
various years against Dr. Smith and his wife and in due course
filed proper notices of liens in the mortgage records of the parish
where the attached property was situated. Contending that its
lien for unpaid income taxes primed the rights of the attaching
creditor, the United States intervened in the suit, asking for
recognition of its lien and preference in the payment of the pro-
ceeds of the property attached. From a judgment of the trial
court recognizing the university's claim, maintaining the writ of
attachment and recognizing the university's privilege on all of
the property seized, the United States appealed. The appellant
contended that no privilege resulted from the mere attachment,
but that the lien came into existence only upon rendition of
judgment maintaining the attachment. Among other authorities
relied upon by appellant was the code provision stating that at-
tachment and sequestration "give no privilege to those who have
made them, until they have obtained a judgment and order of
execution on the property sequestered" or attached.7 4 Although
this fact does not readily appear from the opinion rendered in
the instant case, the prior jurisprudence was in conflict on the
subject of whether mere attachment confers a privilege upon
the seizing creditor 7 In the principal case, the supreme court
held that an attaching creditor is granted rights on the property
attached superior to all mortgages, privileges and liens arising
thereafter, although before rendition of judgment maintaining
the attachment itself. The lien of the United States for unpaid
income taxes was held to be general and not a priority lien,
under which the rights of the government were inferior to those
74. Art. 724, La. Code of Practice of 1870 uses the words "provisional
seizures" and "provisionally seized," but these words are erroneous transla-
tions from the original French of the Code of Practice of 1825, and must be
construed to mean "attachments" and "attached." James Beck & Co. v.
Brady, 6 La. Ann. 444 (1851); Emerson v. Fox, 3 La. 178 (1831); In re Rich-
ards & Holloway, 35 F. Supp. 51 (D. C. La. 1940).
75. "An attachment enables the creditor to obtain payment out of the
property attached, in preference to others, not on the ground that he has
acquired a lien upon it, but because he has first used the process of the
court, to seize and put it into the possession of the sheriff for the purpose
of obtaining his payment. The law and the courts will not, therefore, allow
other ordinary creditors or other process to interfere with him. If, however,
other creditors had a lien or privilege, they would take the proceeds of the
property in preference to the attaching creditor, because the latter had no
lien or privilege." James Beck and Co. v. Brady, 6 La. Ann. 444, 445 (1851).
However, compare Tufts v. Carradine, 3 La. Ann. 430 (1848) and Cochran
and Co. v. Walker, 10 La. Ann. 431 (1855), holding that the attachment con-
fers a privilege upon the seizing creditor. See also Emerson v. Fox, 3 La.
178 (1831); Harris v. Andrews and Co., 20 La. Ann. 561 (1868).
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of the prior attaching creditor, The decision in the principal case
has accomplished a satisfactory solution of a somewhat vexing
problem and should settle the jurisprudence on this point once
and for all.
Several interesting questions on injunction procedure were
presented in Pennington v. Drews.76 The plaintiff by contract
had obtained the exclusive use of a geophysical instrument in-
vented by the defendant for use in certain types of geophysical
explorations. One provision of the agreement imposed a penalty
of twenty-five dollars per day as damages due to the inventor's
refusal or neglect in failing to comply with certain features of
the contract. Alleging a breach of the agreement, plaintiff insti-
tuted suit, praying for specific performance of the contract, for
a judgment awarding plaintiff certain conventional penalties and
for injunctive relief prohibiting defendant from doing certain
acts prohibited by the contract. The defense interposed in the
trial court was levelled primarily at the invalidity of the contract
on grounds not pertinent here. Defendant also successfully con-
tended in the court of original jurisdiction that no injunctive
relief could be granted in view of the penalty provision of the
agreement on the theory that other adequate legal remedies
existed. Under its supervisory jurisdiction, the court annulled
the judgment of the trial court recalling the injunctive orders
and dismissing the suit under defendant's exceptions of no right
and no cause of action. The contract was held valid and enforce-
able and the penalty provision recognized as intended to cover
only an incidental item of possible damage to plaintiff and not
the latter's broad interest under the contract. Considering the
plaintiff's investment in perfecting this invention and the irre-
parable injury which would be sustained unless proper injunc-
tive relief were granted, the court reinstated the temporary re-
straining order previously issued by the trial judge and remanded
the case for further proceedings consistent with the action of
the appellate court.
A common error of injunction procedure was corrected on
appeal in Ridgepark v. Police Jury of Jefferson Parish.77 At the
conclusion of the trial of the rule to show cause why a prelimi-
nary injunction should not be issued, the trial judge dismissed
the rule and at the same time rendered a judgment on the merits,
rejecting plaintiff's demands. Inasmuch as the only matter be-
76. 209 La. 1, 24 So. (2d) 156 (1945).
77. 27 So. (2d) 128 (La. 1946).
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fore the trial judge prior to rendition of judgment was the ques-
tion of whether a preliminary injunction should issue, the ap-
pellate court properly reversed the judgment appealed from.
Actions Affecting Title to Immovables
Froyn the standpoint of the value of the property in controv-
ersy, the most important decision of the supreme court during
the past term was American Guaranty Company v. Sunset Realty
& Planting Company.78 This litigation involved a considerable
portion of the lands within the productive area of the recently-
discovered oil field at Paradis, Louisiana. Two suits instituted
by plaintiff, consolidated for trial and appeal, presented demands
for the rescission and cancellation on the ground of fraud of two
quitclaim deeds executed by plaintiff. These had been procured
by one Small, for himself and the other defendants, in curing
possible defects in the title to lands previously leased by the
named defendant. Three specific grounds of fraud on the part of
Small were alleged by the petitions: (1) that he had advised
plaintiff that a well in the immediate area of the lands in ques-
tion was a gas well producing some distillate and that no market
for the gas existed at the time, whereas in truth and in fact it
was a valuable oil well; (2) that Small represented that the
named defendant had a good and paramount title to all of the
property in controversy, whereas in truth and in fact it had no
title whatsoever to portions of this land and a doubtful claim on
the remainder; and (3) that the day after the execution of the
quitclaim deeds, under the pretext of correcting certain typo-
graphical errors in one of the quitclaim deeds, Small induced
plaintiff to execute a substitute document in which an omnibus
clause covering additional property had been inserted surreptiti-
ously and without the knowledge of plaintiff.
The trial of the case required considerable periods of time,
extending over more than one year. Because of the unusual size
of the transcripts, the numerous and lengthy briefs filed in the
appellate court, and the multiple issues of law and fact pre-
sented, the supreme court allowed a full day for the argument
of the case originally. After a rehearing was granted, another
full day was allowed for argument of the case on rehearing.
Thereafter, the case was taken under advisement for a number
of months while the appellate court studied the cause. The close-
ness of the factual questions presented, and the difficulty of de-
78. 208 La. 772, 23 So. (2d) 409 (1945).
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termination of these issues, are best attested by the holdings of
the courts as this case went from the trial to the appellate court
and through the process of two hearings in the latter. The trial
judge resolved all factual issues in favor of the defendants and
rejected plaintiff's demands. On original hearing, the supreme
court cancelled the omnibus clause in the substituted quitclaim,
but otherwise affirmed the trial court's findings of fact. On re-
hearing, the majority of the court held in favor of plaintiff on
substantially all issues presented, but even then one member of
the court dissented.
As intimated above, on rehearing the majority of the court
sustained plaintiff's first ground of alleged fraud. On this point,
the court concluded that the well in question, which was very
close to the lands in controversy, was known by Small and his
principals to be producing 125 barrels of distillate daily on a
very small choke and capable of sustained production of ap-
proximately double that amount if the choke were increased
slightly. Though in one sense of the word the well could be said
to be a gas well, the production therefrom was extremely valu-
able and it had the effect of proving that considerable portions
of the lands in controversy had at least a fifty-fifty chance of
being commercially productive.
With respect to the second allegation of fraud, the court on
rehearing pointed out that Sunset Realty & Planting Company
had a doubtful title to a portion of the lands in question, and
had no title whatsoever to any of the property included in the
omnibus provision of the substitute quitclaim document; and
that Small was guilty of fraudulent misrepresentations in ad-
vising plaintiff that the named defendant had a good and para-
mount title to all of the lands in question.
In both the original opinion and that handed down on re-
hearing, the court resolved the issues relating to the third alle-
gation of fraud in favor of plaintiff. Limitations of space do not
permit even a summary of the evidence considered by the court
on this. point and serving as a basis for its factual conclusions.
For present purposes, however, it suffices to state that the court
found circumstantial evidence sufficiently conclusive to justify
its position that the substitute quitclaim deed was merely a
device utilized by Small to include surreptitiously therein the
omnibus provision effecting a transfer of property from the
plaintiff. In fact, under its conclusion that Small had been guilty
of actionable fraud on this point, the court treated all his testi-
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mony in the case as having been impeached and thoroughly dis-
credited, and determined the other factual issues without giving
effect to Small's testimony on these points.
Assuming, as the reader must, the correctness of the court's
findings of fact, the opinion in this case does not appear to an-
nounce any new or startling principle of law. The broad doc-
trines consecrated by Article 1847 of the Civil Code would appear
a sufficiently broad base for the court's position. In procuring
these quitclaims, the parties were dealing at arm's length and
Small was under no duty whatsoever to divulge any information
to plaintiff concerning the validity of its title or the value of the
property. He could have remained silent, but he elected to speak.
Thereby the duty was imposed upon him to tell the whole truth
and conceal nothing which had a material bearing upon either
the title to or the value of the property.
It has been asserted by a few that this decision will make it
impossible for mineral lessees to cure possible defects in their
title through quitclaim deeds from possible adverse claimants.
This statement is based upon contentions that it is impossible
to obtain these deeds by dealing at arm's length and remaining
silent, and that the slightest error in representations to the other
party as to the validity of titles or value of the property may
result in the subsequent rescission of the quitclaim for fraud
and misrepresentation. It is admitted that the Sunset Realty
case will serve as a constant warning against overreaching, but
it is believed that this "viewing with alarm" is unjustified. On
the other hand, the court should be commended for its insistence
upon standards of business ethics higher than the "morals of
the market place." Furthermore, the law applied has been the
law of Louisiana since its founding, and the equity jurisprudence
of the remainder of the American states for more than a century.
The rescission of these quitclaim deeds does not have the
effect of vesting valid title to the properties in controversy in
plaintiff. Prior to the trial of this case, petitory actions had been
instituted in .the lower court by defendants. Though neither of
the opinions in this case attempts to adjudicate any issue of title,
it appears that very serious questions are presented in these
petitory actions.
Miscellaneous
In Succession of Land,7 9 the appellant had applied to be ap-
79. 209 La. 135, 24 So. (2d) 289 (1945).
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pointed administrator of the succession and had procured an
order from the lower court appointing the notary public to take
an inventory of property alleged to have belonged to but to have
been omitted from the succession. At the instance of another
heir, the trial judge recalled its order appointing the notary and
dismissed the application for administration. The present appeal
is from this judgment. Subsequent to the rendition of the decree
complained of, appellant prayed for a partition of the property
belonging to the succession. Asserting that the partition suit
constituted an acquiescence in the judgment appealed from, ap-
pellee moved to dismiss the appeal. The court noted that the
prosecution of the partition action could hardly be said to con-
stitute any acquiescence in the judgment complained of, since
the second action represented a continuance of appellant's efforts
to have certain property alleged to belong to the succession dis-
tributed to the heirs. The settled rule that the only judgment
acquiescence in which precludes an appeal is a decree command-
ing that something be done or given was applied as the basis for
a denial of the motion to dismiss.
Time honored rules of expropriation procedure were applied
in Housing Authority v. Gondolfo.80 Defendant prosecuted an ap-
peal from a judgment rendered upon the verdict of a jury of
freeholders, claiming the inadequacy of the award. It is settled
in this state that although the verdicts of freeholders juries in
eminent domain cases may be amended when manifestly inade-
quate, they may not be disputed except in cases of gross or mani-
fest error. To some extent these jurors possess the character and
authority of experts who are presumed to have personal knowl-
edge of the matters submitted to them, and are authorized to
act on their own opinions as well as on the evidence submitted.
In the present case the fact that a number of experts had testified
to a higher value of the property sought to be expropriated was
held not to be conclusive of the value of the property. The judg-
ment rendered upon the verdict submitted by the freeholders
jury was affirmed.
Herbert v. American Society of Composers, Authors and
Publishers8 is of interest not only because of the procedural
points involved but also because plaintiff was a son of the cele-
brated composer, Victor Herbert, and the case involved royalties
receivable from his musical compositions. After a divorce be-
80. 208 I.m 1065, 24 So. (2d) 78 (1945).
81. 210 La. 240, 26 So. (2d) 732 (1946).
1947]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
tween plaintiff and his wife, a property settlement was affected
under which the wife was assigned twenty-eight hundred dollars
per annum out of the royalties accruing to plaintiff as a member
of ASCAP. Under the latter's constitution and by-laws, any as-
signment of future royalties was prohibited. Taking the position
that the assignment to his wife was invalid for this reason, plain-
tiff notified defendant organization of his intention to test the
validity thereof and informed ASCAP that it would be held re-
sponsible for the payment of any future royalties to the wife
thereunder. Subsequently, plaintiff sued the defendant to recover
royalties which had accrued since the service of his notice upon
defendant. Dtfendant voluntarily appeared in the suit, deposited
the royalties then due into the registry of the court and im-
pleaded plaintiff and his wife to assert their respective claims
thereto. The wife asserted her claim under the assignment,
which plaintiff asserted was invalid as being contrary to the
constitution and by-laws of the defendant association. The court
very properly held that the prohibition against the assignment
of future royalties had been inserted purely for the protection
of ASCAP, and since the latter had waived this protection by
making payments to the wife under the assignment until in-
structed to the contrary by plaintiff, and by depositing the roy-
alties due into the registry of the court, the validity of the as-
signment to the wife was upheld and judgment rendered in her
favor.
Under the provisions of the Code of Practice, costs are as-
sessed against the party cast. 2 This strict and somewhat arbitrary
rule continued to be the law of Louisiana until 1910, when a
statute was adopted empowering the appellate courts to tax
costs in both lower and appellate courts against any party to the
suit as might be deemed equitable.2 In Scacciaferro v. Hymel, 4
it was held that when the appellate court failed to utilize the
provisions of this statute at the time the case was decided on
appeal, the code provisions relative to assignment of costs against
the party cast would apply.
During the excitement and tension of a law suit, the frayed
nerves of attorneys sometimes give way, with the result that
82. Art. 157, La. Code of Practice of 1870, provides that the person in
whose favor judgment is rendered in the trial court is entitled to recover
costs of the proceeds. Under Art. 908, La. Code of Practice of 1870, if the
judgment be reversed on appeal to any extent, the appellee is required to
pay the costs.
83. La. Act 229 of 1910, § 2 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1977].
84. 209 La. 537, 25 So. (2d) 87 (1946).
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attorneys lose their tempers and verbally attack opposing coun-
sel and occasionally even the trial judge himself. State ex rel
Parker v. Mouser' involved one of these unfortunate incidents,
and presented for review the validity of the trial judge's action
in finding an attorney guilty of repeated acts of contempt and
sentencing him to serve five days in jail. The supreme court
accepted the responding judge's version of what transpired at
the time of this contumacy. While opposing counsel was attempt-
ing to argue one phase of the case, relator kept interrupting him,
despite the trial judge's request for more orderly procedure and
repeated admonitions. Thereupon, he was warned that his con-
tinued actions would constitute contempt of court, to which re-
lator replied, "Go ahead and hold me for contempt." The trial
judge then informed relator that he was in contempt and ordered
him to stand for sentence. So that the record might show the
basis for this action, the judge attempted to dictate his reasons
therefor, but was repeatedly interrupted by relator. Finally, re-
lator stated, "If you're going to stick me, go ahead and do it and
cut out that speechmaking." Thereupon, the trial judge held
relator guilty of a second contempt, resulting in the jail sentence
complained of. Under the pertinent statute," the limit of the
power of the court to punish for a single contempt is a fine not
exceeding one hundred dollars or imprisonment not exceeding
twenty-four hours or both; but for more than one contempt the
offender may be punished by a fine not exceeding two hundred
dollars, nor less than one hundred dollars, or imprisonment not
exceeding ten days, or both. The majority of the court held that
only a single continuous contempt had been committed and, ac-
cordingly, annulled the judgment and remanded the case to the
trial court for an appropriate sentence. The Chief Justice dis-
sented vigorously from the holding of the majority, contending
that clearly more than one contempt had been committed and
that the sentence imposed by the trial judge was entirely proper
under the statutory provision. An analysis of the detailed facts
of the case should go far in convincing the reader of the logic of
the dissenting opinion.
85. 208 La. 1093, 24 So. (2d) 151 (1945).
86. La. Rev. Stat. of 1870, § 124 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 452].
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